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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper, I replicate Erikson and Palfrey (2000) who propose that the 
simultaneity problem in measuring the effects of candidate spending can be resolved by 
restricting the sample to close elections. Vote-on-spending effects, which vary with the 
expected closeness of the election outcome in a systematic way, determine the extent of 
simultaneity bias. The simultaneity bias becomes progressively more severe as the 
anticipated vote margin decreases, plaguing the estimates of spending-on-vote effects on 
the full sample. In the range of a 50-50 expected vote, however, the vote-on-spending 
effects approach zero. Thus, by restricting the sample to extremely close races, I obtain 
unbiased estimates of candidate spending effects.  
I then extend their model using data that includes elections that took place after a 
pair of major campaign finance reforms: the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
and the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling of 2010. The BCRA 
heightens the perceived effectiveness of candidate spending by removing the hidden 
substitute for candidates’ campaign funds, namely, soft money. After the Citizens United 
ruling, however, as soft money starts to play a crucial role in electoral campaigns, 
candidates’ own funds matter less. The ruling appears to amplify incumbency advantage, 
perhaps because incumbents take advantage of their non-monetary incumbency benefits 
to attract soft money donations. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate in academia 
over the causal connection between candidate spending and vote share by presenting 
evidence that campaign spending has significant effects on election outcomes.  
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1. Introduction: The Problem of Causal Feedback   
Free, fair, and competitive elections held on a regular basis are crucial for a 
healthy democracy. Most congressional races in the United States, however, are lopsided 
in favor of the incumbent. Challengers find it difficult to overcome the incumbency 
advantage, and thus, they often fail to offer more than token challenges. In the absence of 
competitive challengers, incumbents may have little incentive to respond to voter 
preferences and promote their constituents’ interests. What prevents challengers from 
presenting sufficient challenges to incumbents? 
A number of factors contribute to incumbency advantage. Under the seniority 
system, a veteran representative is expected to deliver policy favors more effectively than 
a freshman representative. Thus, voters tend to vote for an incumbent over a challenger 
(McKelvey and Reizman 1992). In addition, by redrawing district lines to prevent 
competition, incumbents are able to further increase their winning prospects (Cox and 
Katz 2002). Direct officeholder benefits, such as franking privileges, media exposure, 
and fundraising advantages, help an incumbent gain momentum by raising voters’ 
perception of his electoral competitiveness (Levitt 1997). In turn, the initial momentum 
built, in large part, by an incumbent's wider name recognition reinforces his fundraising 
advantage by attracting donors, who tend to invest in a likely winner (Morton and 
Myerson 2012).  
While incumbents may have an advantage in raising money, much empirical work 
suggested that they actually receive fewer votes than their challengers for each dollar 
spent. The literature on campaign spending prior to Jacobson's seminal paper "The 
Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections" (1978) used ordinary least 
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squares regressions (OLS) to measure the effects of candidate spending on obtaining an 
additional vote. Surprisingly, the central finding of this literature was that incumbent 
spending has a negligible effect on the incumbent’s reelection chances (e.g., Abramowitz 
1998, Jacobson 1980, 1985). As Gerber (1998) points out, some studies even showed that 
incumbent spending actually reduces the incumbent vote share. Thus, scholars have been 
hesitant to endorse the view that money is a major source of incumbency advantage.     
The puzzling, and seemingly implausible, estimate of counter-productive 
incumbent spending effects arises from the model’s failure to capture the reciprocal 
causality between a candidate’s fundraising efforts and his winning prospects. For 
instance, incumbents may be using a smaller portion of their budget for actual vote-
winning activities because they are already expecting a landslide victory against a low 
quality challenger. Or, incumbents may receive less bang-for-their-buck than challengers 
due to saturation, as they begin the race with an established brand. Similarly, failure to 
account for the effects of challenger quality on a candidate’s spending decision plagues 
the estimates of spending-on-vote coefficients with simultaneity bias. A low quality 
challenger may be serving his party through a ceremonial candidacy, with little prospect 
of victory. Conversely, for a strategic, high quality challenger who chooses to run against 
a weak incumbent, the conventional OLS model may yield unusually high, upward-
biased estimates of spending effects.  
  To correct for the simultaneity problems, I replicate Erikson and Palfrey 
(2000)’s approach to estimate the marginal effects of candidate spending in the face of 
bidirectional causality. Their data includes 1792 House races, 1974-80 and 1984-90, 
which involve veteran incumbents who won a race from the same district in the previous 
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election. Their model predicts that the simultaneity bias becomes progressively more 
severe as the expected incumbent vote share increases. As a result, in extremely close 
races, estimates of spending effects will be shielded from the simultaneity bias that 
plagues the regression on a wider sample which includes both safe and competitive races. 
Thus, by restricting the sample to competitive districts, where the determinants of the 
expected vote have little influence on candidates' spending decisions, Erikson and Palfrey 
are able to obtain unbiased estimates of candidate spending effects.  
Erikson and Palfrey’s sample ends in 1990, but there have been two major 
campaign finance reforms since then. In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(henceforth referred to as the BCRA) prohibited the use of soft money – nonfederal 
money raised outside the prescribed limits of federal campaign finance laws – in political 
campaigns. Then, in 2010, the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling 
overturned the BCRA by permitting the use and transfer of soft money. By changing the 
role of soft money in political campaigns, it is likely that the two campaign finance 
reforms altered the costs of candidates’ fundraising efforts and capacities. Using a longer 
time series data through 2012, I explore the impact of the BCRA and the Citizens United 
ruling on campaign spending effects. 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews statistical solutions to the simultaneity 
bias. Section 3 introduces the three-equation system used to obtain unbiased estimates of 
spending-on-vote effects. Section 4 describes the data I analyze. Section 5 presents my 
replication results. Section 6 builds upon Erikson and Palfrey’s work by examining the 
impact of the BCRA and the Citizens United on candidates' campaign spending effects. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review: Statistical Solutions to the Simultaneity Bias  
Several statistical methods have been proposed as a solution to the problem of 
causal feedback. Jacobson (1978) applies a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
model, using a measure of the challenger’s political experience as an instrument for 
challenger’s expenditures. He shows that even when purged of simultaneity bias, the 
2SLS results recapitulate the OLS finding that challenger spending is more effective than 
incumbent spending. 
Green and Krasno (1988) criticize Jacobson’s failure to include the independent 
influence of challenger quality in his model. Incumbents that are faced with high quality 
challengers raise and spend more money than safe incumbents who are against a low 
quality challenger. Thus, failure to control for the effects of challenger quality plagues 
the estimates of spending effects with endogeneity bias. To account for the influence of 
challenger quality on each candidate’s spending decision, Green and Krasno constructed 
a scoring scale for traits that are likely to affect the electoral outcome, such as physical 
attractiveness or skill. As a proxy for another possibly endogenous regressor – incumbent 
spending in the current election – they rely on the lagged value of incumbent spending.   
Green and Krasno (1988) depart from Jacobson’s analysis by concluding that 
incumbent spending effects are statistically significant. Challenger spending effects, on 
the other hand, are not only lower than estimated in Jacobson (1978), but also subject to 
diminishing marginal returns. The validity of their approach, however, depends on the 
problematic assumption that incumbent expenditures in the previous election have no 
effect on the outcome of the current election. Oftentimes, incumbency advantage in the 
current election is a cumulative result of spending in the past. Incumbent spending in the 
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past election carries over to the current election cycle to improve and sustain the 
durability of incumbency advantage, which undermines the validity of Green and 
Krasno’s key assumption.  
Moreover, as Gerber (1998) points out, due to the lack of an adequate instrument 
for challenger spending, Green and Krasno are forced to treat challenger spending as 
exogenous. Treating challenger spending as an exogenous variable becomes problematic, 
since the spending decisions of both incumbent and challenger jointly affect the outcome 
of the election. Gerber improves upon the existing literature by treating both challenger 
and incumbent spending as endogenous. To do so, he employs a new set of instrumental 
variables – variables that are likely to influence campaign spending without directly 
affecting the election itself, such as state population and challenger wealth. State 
population is a valid instrument; while there is no causal relationship between population 
and vote share, it does influence candidate spending levels as candidates from smaller 
states raise larger sums per capita than those from populous states. Gerber’s choice of 
challenger wealth as an instrument, on the other hand, is questionable. Candidate wealth 
may affect vote-share by influencing voters' perception of the candidate's viability (or 
lack thereof). To some voters, a candidate's fame as a business executive may imply a 
lack of good governance skills. Other voters may be particularly supportive of the idea of 
business executives making a leap into political office. In both cases, candidate wealth 
will have a direct impact on the electoral outcome. Gerber’s 2SLS model may therefore 
still be subject to the problem of endogeneity. 
In an alternative approach, Erikson and Palfrey (1998) apply the "uncorrelated 
errors" model to control for the problem of causal feedback. Due to bidirectional 
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causality between X and Y, a simple OLS estimate represents the correlation between X 
and Y, not the effect of Y on X. The correlation between X and Y, in turn, consists 
of some combination of , the effect of Y on X; , the effect of X on Y; and the 
correlation between the error terms (Erikson and Palfrey 1982).   
With the assumption that the correlation between error terms is zero, the 
correlation between X and Y is attributed solely to the two reciprocal paths between X 
and Y. Using an instrumental variable that affects Y only through X, one can estimate 
, which can then be used to estimate the unknown path , the effect of Y on X. 
Thus, assuming that shocks to incumbent and challenger spending are uncorrelated 
allows unbiased estimation of the effect of spending on votes.  
The uncorrelated errors model, however, "over-adjusts" for the causal feedback 
between campaign spending and vote share as it assumes that candidates have access to 
perfect information about the election. The model fails to account for the fact that while 
candidates may have access to additional information that is not captured in the simple 
OLS model, such information may still be imperfect.  
To account for the disparity between the uncorrelated errors model and the 
conventional OLS approach, Erikson and Palfrey (1998) construct a parameter λ to 
measure how well candidate spending responds to national short-term forces and to the 
unobserved residual of the vote equation. λ  captures candidates' perception of forces that 
can potentially affect the election outcome, such as local campaign-specific 
circumstances or the prior election's short-term forces. Using maximum likelihood 
estimation, Erikson and Palfrey obtain different values of λ for veteran incumbents, 
veteran challengers, freshmen incumbents, and freshmen challengers.  
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Through this specification, they find that the challenger spending effects remain 
stable throughout an incumbent's career cycle, whereas incumbent spending effects 
decline considerably after the freshman election and continue to run into diminishing 
marginal returns. Yet, incumbents offset their relative disadvantage in spending effects 
by outspending their challengers. After about the fifth term, however, the incumbent's net 
spending effect becomes negative due to the progressively lower efficacy of incumbent 
spending. Erikson and Palfrey conclude that while challengers may find it difficult to 
combat freshmen incumbents' initial spending advantage, they enjoy a competitive 
spending effect against senior incumbents whose extra dollar fails to earn them as many 
votes as before. 
Erikson and Palfrey (2000) use a game-theoretic approach to neutralize the effects 
of candidates' expectations of the election outcome on their spending decisions. They 
solve for the Nash equilibrium of a spending game between challenger and incumbent, 
defined as a pair of spending decisions for each candidate, I* and C*, through which each 
maximizes his payoff, given the spending level of the opponent and the current electoral 
conditions. Both I* and C* vary with the anticipated vote margin in a systematic way. 
They both decrease in elections that favor the incumbent, and increase in elections where 
the anticipated vote margin is small. In the closest possible race, in which the anticipated 
vote margin is zero, equilibrium spending is maximized for both candidates. As a result, 
for extremely close races, the slope of spending with respect to expected vote share 
approaches zero. Thus, the vote-on-spending effects that cause the simultaneity bias are 
virtually nonexistent in this region. However, the vote-on-spending slope becomes 
steeply negative in safe districts. Consequently, the extent of simultaneity bias becomes 
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progressively more severe as the expected vote margin increases in favor of the 
incumbent.  
The vast majority of races in the U.S., however, are lopsided in favor of the 
incumbent. Thus, even if instrumental variables are employed to control for candidates' 
expectations of the election outcome, prior studies that pool data across both safe and 
competitive districts are fundamentally flawed. Erikson and Palfrey (2000) depart from 
the prior studies by focusing on the range of a 50-50 expected vote, in which 
the spending-on-vote effects are shielded from the simultaneity bias that plagues the 
estimates on a wider set of races.  
 
 
3. Model 
 
I replicate Erikson and Palfrey’s estimation of spending-on-vote effects using the 
following three-equation system.  
  	
        (1) 

  	  	                             (2) 
                                   (3) 
where 
V= incumbent percentage of the (two-party) vote; 
C=the log of challenger spending (in 1978 dollars) 
I=the log of incumbent spending (in 1978 dollars) 
Z=an instrumental variable, used as a measure of anticipated incumbent vote that is 
uncontaminated by spending effects 
	  Challenger’s vote-on-spending effects 
    Incumbent’s vote-on-spending effects 
	  Challenger’s spending-on-vote effects 
  Incumbent’s spending-on-vote effects  
       and  	  		  	  (includes vote-on-spending effects, imperfect 
signal observed by candidates, and noise term)  
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Equation (1) is a 2SLS model which estimates the effects of the expected 
incumbent vote on the incumbent and challenger spending. As vote-on-spending effects 
vary with expected vote margin in a nonlinear way, spending-on-vote effects must be 
estimated contingent on the value of Z, the expected incumbent vote. The systematic 
variation of 	  and  enables easy grouping of the sample into progressively more 
problematic bins, as the strength of the vote-on-spending effects determines the extent of 
the endogeneity bias. Following Erikson and Palfrey, I group the sample into four cases 
according to different values of Z,:   52; 52    55; 55    58; 58  . 
As established in the previous section, the simultaneity bias vanishes in the 
neighborhood of a 50-50 expected vote, yet becomes progressively more severe as the 
expected vote margin increases. Thus, by restricting the sample to cases in which Z<52, a 
subset of races for which the game-theoretic model predicts near-zero simultaneity bias, I 
derive unbiased estimates of spending-on-vote effects.  
Conceptually, the disturbances in equations (2) and (3) include the effects of 
unmeasured sources of the vote on each candidate's electoral expectations. As in Erikson 
and Palfrey (1998), the uncorrelated errors assumption applies to the covariances between 
the error term of the vote and each spending variable, but not between the two spending 
variables. By assuming nonzero effects of incumbent and challenger spending on each 
other, the model can capture the following possibilities: 1) Spending by one candidate 
may affect the other's spending decision, apart from an indirect effect via the expected 
vote; 2) Factors such as district demographics and the nature of the local media market 
can affect both spending variables, independent of the expected closeness of the race 
(Stratmann 2007).  
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4. Data 
My data come from Gary Jacobson. The data cover every House election from 
1972-2012. Jacobson's data, however, are not identical to that of Erikson and Palfrey, 
perhaps due to the retrospective nature of the campaign finance reports. In my replication 
of Erikson and Palfrey (2000), I use 2122 contested House races, 1974-80 and 1984-90, 
only including veteran incumbents who were elected in the same district in the previous 
election. Freshmen incumbents are excluded from the analysis as they tend to enjoy 
unusually high spending effects due to the surge of electoral success in their first 
reelections. Thus, of the 3480 House elections from this period, I exclude 891 races that 
involved freshmen incumbents or seats not defended by major party incumbents. Since 
the focus of my analysis is the disparity between the incumbent and challenger spending 
effects, I also exclude 337 races that did not have a challenger up against a veteran 
incumbent, such as races for an open seat or elections involving two freshmen 
incumbents. To match Erikson and Palfrey’s data, the 1982, 1992, and 2002 races were 
excluded from my analysis, because the lagged incumbent vote of the previous elections 
did not match the 1982/1992/2002 incumbent vote due to redistricting. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. 
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics for Model Variables 
Variable     Mean Standard   
Deviation      
    Skewness      Kurtosis           N 
 
Incumbent Vote 
Share 
 
District 
Presidential 
Vote for the 
Incumbent 
Party 
 
Logged 
Incumbent 
Spending 
 
     
    65.66 
 
 
 
   57.11             
 
 
 
    3.76 
 
    
       
    9.92 
 
 
 
  12.13                    
 
 
 
   0.91 
 
     
 
0.13 
 
 
 
0.27 
 
 
 
      -0.56 
 
 
 
        2.98 
 
 
 
3.35 
 
 
 
       3.99 
 
 
 
6583 
 
 
 
7748 
 
 
 
      7738 
 
 
Logged 
Challenger 
Spending 
      
    2.09 
  
    1.49 
 
0.29 
 
2.06 
 
6514 
      
 
     
 
 
I replicate Erikson and Palfrey (2000)'s construction of the instrumental variable 
Z, the measure of the expected incumbent vote that is uncontaminated by spending 
effects. I obtain Z from a reduced-form regression that predicts the incumbent vote from 
a number of exogenous sources: lagged incumbent vote; district presidential vote for the 
incumbent's party; fixed effects for year, incumbent party, a dummy for southern states, 
and the relevant interaction terms generating separate intercepts for different groups 
according to year, incumbent party, and region (South/non-South), such as "non-southern 
1974 Republicans."  
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5. Replication of Erikson and Palfrey (2000)  
Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the logarithm of real challenger spending (in 1978 
dollars) in the U.S. House elections between 1972-1980 and 1984-1990 against 
incumbent vote share. The fitted nonlinear regression line shows that challenger spending 
reaches its maximum near 40% of the incumbent vote and slightly decreases thereafter. 
Challengers’ spending pattern as shown in Figure 1 closely replicates the pattern shown 
in Erikson and Palfrey (2000). The downward sloping regression line becomes steeper 
when incumbent vote share exceeds 50%.   
Similarly, as predicted by Erikson and Palfrey (2000)'s theoretical spending 
game, Figure 2 shows that incumbent spending is maximized in the range of 40-55% 
incumbent vote share. On the other hand, when the incumbent vote share exceeds 55%, 
incumbent spending begins to decline as incumbents feel safe. 
 
Challengers increase their spending in close elections, when the electoral outcome is 
slightly in favor of challengers.   
17 
 
 
 
Incumbents maximize spending in the range of 40-55% incumbent vote share. This is 
consistent with Erikson and Palfrey’s finding that incumbents tend to spend more in 
close elections.  
 
Figure 3 displays the effects of anticipated vote (Z) on spending. The vote-on-
spending slopes replicate the patterns in Figures 1 and 2. Consistent with Erikson and 
Palfrey (2000)'s theory, despite the decrease in the level of effort on the part of both 
incumbents and challengers, the safer the expected outcome of the race, the larger the 
spending gap between the incumbent and challenger. The incumbent's chances of victory 
rise as the challenger quality declines. Consequently, when the seat is perceived as safe 
for incumbents, the decline in both challenger quality and challenger’s winning prospects 
makes it harder for the challenger to raise money for a given level of effort. Therefore, an 
incumbent's advantage over a challenger in raising and spending campaign funds 
increases with the incumbent’s likelihood of winning.  
18 
 
 
 
The gap between incumbent and challenger spending virtually disappears in very 
competitive districts. Incumbents' spending advantage over challengers increases in 
safe races.  
 
 
However, note that the spending gap virtually disappears in close races where the 
predicted incumbent vote is slightly below 50%. All else equal, challengers spend more 
when their electoral prospects are good, whereas incumbents tend to spend more when 
they are in electoral trouble (Erikson and Palfrey 2000). Therefore, in general, challenger 
spending is positively correlated with challenger vote share, whereas incumbent spending 
is negatively correlated with incumbent vote share. Conventional OLS models are thus 
likely to overestimate the challenger spending effect and underestimate the incumbent 
spending effect. Since approximately 95% (2014 of 2122) of the U.S. House elections 
are lopsided in favor of the incumbent, conventional OLS models give rise to the 
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puzzling result that incumbent spending has little or no effect on obtaining votes, while 
challenger spending does.  
Candidates' ability to raise and spend campaign funds is determined by the level 
of effort and winning prospects. In the range of 45-55% expected incumbent vote, the 
incumbent's ability to raise campaign funds is jeopardized by poor electoral chances, 
which offset the increased effort, leading to a flat curve as shown in Figure 3. Therefore, 
incumbent spending in this range can be treated simply as exogenous and thus be 
estimated via OLS. Challenger spending, on the other hand, exhibits no such flat area. An 
increase in the winning prospects amplifies, rather than offsets, the increased effort, 
leading to a steep curve; for challengers, the higher the chance of winning, the greater the 
amount of spending. Thus, the difference in the magnitude of the two slopes in the range 
of close elections implies that Erikson and Palfrey's approach more reliably predicts 
incumbent spending effects than it does challenger spending effects. Still, the slope of the 
challenger spending is flatter in the range of close races than in safer races. Thus, 
restricting the sample to the range of close races will reduce the bias. Furthermore, a high 
variance for challenger spending, as exhibited by the relatively steeper challenger 
spending curve, will attenuate the remaining upward bias of the OLS estimate of the 
spending-on-vote coefficients (the reader is referred to Erikson and Palfrey 2000 for 
mathematical detail). 
Table 2 displays three different estimates of the spending effects coefficients from 
equations that predict the effects of incumbent and challenger spending using the measure 
of expected vote.  
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The three columns respectively display Erikson and Palfrey's original estimates 
(Erikson and Palfrey 2000 Table 1), naïve OLS estimates, and replication regression 
estimates using a robust regression technique (the last two each estimated using 
Jacobson's data). Robust regression excludes high leverage data points from the analysis 
and down-weighs data points with large absolute residuals1.  
The first row displays spending coefficients for extremely close races with an 
incumbent vote below 52%. In contrast to Erikson and Palfrey, whose estimates yield 
virtually identical coefficients for incumbent and challenger spending effects, both OLS 
and robust regression reveal that a dollar spent by a challenger is more effective than a 
dollar spent by an incumbent. However, both incumbent and challenger spending still 
matter significantly in close races across all three columns, even after controlling for high 
leverage data points and outliers. The extent to which estimates in the third column 
resemble the coefficients in the first column confirms the robustness of Erikson and 
Palfrey's model by showing that their estimates were not simply driven by anomalous 
data points.  
In relatively close races with an incumbent vote in the range of 52-55%, I see a 
slight decrease in the magnitude of both incumbent and challenger spending coefficients 
in all estimates. However, similar to the case above, challenger spending is more 
effective than incumbent spending.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 I use STATA’s rreg command with the default settings.  
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Table 2. Regression of Spending on Incumbent Vote by Expected 
Incumbent Vote (Z) 
Z<52%       (1) Original              (2) Naïve OLS  (3) Replication 
CE -4.11 
(-3.49) 
-5.68*** 
(1.114) 
  -5.21*** 
(1.287) 
IE 4.04 
(2.21) 
4.05*** 
(1.363) 
3.65** 
(1.530) 
Constant 50.55 
(2.23) 
55.50*** 
(3.899) 
55.65*** 
(4.211) 
Observations 40 34 39 
.  0.193 0.421 0.275 
52<Z<55%      (1) Original              (2) Naïve OLS  (3) Replication 
CE -4.37 
(-7.80) 
-4.47*** 
(0.979) 
-4.00*** 
(0.576) 
IE 3.06 
(3.64) 
3.28*** 
(0.979) 
4.01*** 
(0.914) 
Constant 16.72 
(0.48) 
56.38*** 
(3.382) 
51.73*** 
(3.157) 
Observations 77 74 65 
.  0.457 0.395 0.437 
55<Z<58%      (1) Original              (2) Naïve OLS  (3) Replication 
CE -2.94 
(-6.47) 
-3.53*** 
(0.489) 
-3.62*** 
(0.485) 
IE 0.86 
(1.59) 
1.75*** 
(0.703) 
2.05*** 
(0.701) 
Constant 34.21 
(1.10) 
60.70*** 
(2.316) 
59.67*** 
(2.303) 
Observations 119 124 128 
.  0.291 0.294 0.300 
Z>58%      (1) Original              (2) Naïve OLS  (3) Replication 
CE -3.41 
(-26.34) 
-4.79*** 
(0.139) 
-4.79*** 
(0.138) 
IE -0.10 
(-0.56) 
-0.96*** 
(0.210) 
-0.91*** 
(0.209) 
Constant 54.10 
(17.52) 
79.11*** 
(0.636) 
78.87*** 
(0.635) 
Observations 1556 1890 1893 
.  0.675 0.458 0.458 
All Cases Pooled      (1) Original              (2) Naïve OLS  (3) Replication 
CE -3.36 
(-27.83) 
-5.24*** 
(0.129) 
-5.26*** 
(0.129) 
IE 0.07 
(0.38) 
-0.64*** 
(0.210) 
-0.59*** 
(0.205) 
Constant 53.92 
(19.56) 
78.27*** 
(0.621) 
78.08*** 
(0.624) 
Observations 1792 2122 2122 
.  0.722 0.509 0.507 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes for Table 2: I replicated Erikson and Palfrey’s original estimates using robust 
regression which drops high leverage outliers. All three columns show that both 
incumbent (IE) and challenger spending (CE) matter significantly in close races. The 
simultaneity bias appears gradually as the expected incumbent vote share increases, 
underestimating the incumbent spending effects while overestimating the challenger 
spending effects. When the expected incumbent vote exceeds 58%, the simultaneity 
bias is so strong that the incumbent spending coefficient takes a puzzling, negative 
sign.  
 
Row 3 expands the analysis to races that are slightly lopsided in favor of the 
incumbent. As shown in Figure 3, this is the range in which the slope for the incumbent 
vote-on-spending curve reverses its sign and becomes negative. Thus, as predicted, the 
coefficient for the incumbent spending effect is smaller than that in the more competitive 
races. From row 1 to row 3, all three estimates predict a steady decline in incumbent 
spending effect. In fact, the estimated incumbent spending effect becomes negative when 
the expected incumbent vote share exceeds 58%, as the simultaneity bias overwhelms the 
true effect.  
As Erikson and Palfrey (2000) point out, however, it would be a mistake to treat 
the coefficients in rows 4 and 5 as true spending effects. Once the seat is perceived as 
safe, incumbents tend to spend less on vote-winning activities. Thus, the vote-on-
spending effects and the spending-on-vote effects have opposite signs. Consequently, the 
former offset the latter, causing a severe downward bias in an OLS estimate of spending-
on-vote effects. Conversely, for challengers, vote-on-spending effects and the spending-
on-vote effects always have the same sign. A challenger’s electoral viability enables the 
challenger to more effectively raise funds, which in turn has a positive influence on the 
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vote. Thus, vote-on-spending effects cause an upward bias in the spending-on-vote 
effects. 
 
 
6. Extension of Erikson and Palfrey (2000): Post-Citizens United 
In this section, by pooling data across a longer time series (1974-2012), I build on 
the work of Erikson and Palfrey (2000) to examine the impact of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (2002) and the Citizens United v. FEC ruling (2010) on 
candidates' campaign spending effects. The BCRA prohibited the parties’ use of soft 
money in elections. Then, in 2010, the Citizens United v. FEC ruling overturned the 
BCRA by lifting the federal limit on the soft money contributions in a political campaign. 
Table 3 displays the regression estimates of spending-on-vote effects. I restrict the 
sample to close races with an incumbent vote share below 52% to minimize simultaneity 
bias. Column (1) presents estimates from the 1974-2000 election cycles, before the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) came into effect. The 2002 races are excluded 
from the analysis due to redistricting. Column (2) presents estimates from the 2004-2008 
election cycles, when the BCRA was in full force. Column (3) displays estimates from 
the 2010 and 2012 races, which took place after the Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission ruling (2010) overturned the BCRA.  
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Table 3. Spending Effectiveness by Era of Campaign Finance Law 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Date Range 1972-2000 2002-2008 2010-2012 
 Pre-BCRA BCRA Post-Citizens 
United 
    
Challenger 
Spending 
-5.003*** 
(0.860) 
-8.079*** 
(2.015) 
-4.097*** 
(1.243) 
    
    
Incumbent 
Spending 
4.447*** 
(1.134) 
6.406 
(4.003) 
0.286 
(3.621) 
    
    
Constant 52.28*** 58.90*** 67.43*** 
 (3.693) (15.20) (17.16) 
    
Observations 66 29 27 
Adj. R" 0.336 0.402 0.278 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes for Table 3: The results display a vast increase in both spending coefficients after 
the BCRA came into effect. By removing the influence of soft money, the BCRA seems 
to have heightened the perceived effectiveness of candidate spending. The Citizens 
United ruling, on the other hand, led to a steep decline in candidate spending effects. 
The seemingly implausible estimate of negligible incumbent spending effects strongly 
suggests that the coefficients are plagued with omitted variable bias.  
 
As presented in column (1), both incumbent and challenger spending matter 
significantly in the pre-BCRA era. Prior to the BCRA, soft money served as a substitute 
for candidates' own campaign funds. In the 1999-2000 election cycle, before the BCRA 
came into effect, soft money accounted for 40% of fundraising for the two major parties 
(Briffault 2002). Soft money was used for voter registration efforts, "get-out-the-vote" 
drives, and vote-winning activities to build support for a particular candidate. Thus, with 
soft money donations, candidates had less incentive to attend fundraisers to raise 
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campaign resources, as fundraising activities not only consumed a large portion of 
candidates’ time, but also often involved taking compromising issue positions (Erikson 
and Palfrey 2000). 
Column (2) shows that when the BCRA came into effect, both challenger and 
incumbent spending effects increased sharply. Under the BCRA, candidates could no 
longer rely on soft money to pay for vote-winning activities. By removing the hidden 
substitute (i.e., soft money), the BCRA heightened the perceived effectiveness of 
candidate money.  
Column (3) shows that the Citizens United v. FEC ruling has led to a drastic 
decline in both incumbent and challenger spending effects. With the ruling in effect, soft 
money, the hidden substitute for candidates' own campaign funds, is now back on the 
political scene, crowding out the perceived spending effect of candidates' own 
budget. Candidates that receive more soft money donations are also likely to raise and 
spend less money of their own, ceteris paribus. Yet, since my data on reported candidate 
expenditures do not include soft money transfers, I only observe the effect of candidates' 
own funds. In this case, if both types of spending are effective, the omitted variable (soft 
money), which is negatively correlated with the variable of interest (official campaign 
spending), will give rise to a downward bias of the estimated coefficient. In fact, a drastic 
decrease in both spending coefficients implies that the estimated spending effects in the 
post-Citizens United sample may be subject to omitted variable bias.  
According to column (3), a dollar spent by an incumbent has a negligible effect in 
obtaining an additional vote, whereas a challenger's marginal spending effect remains 
significant. While the estimated marginal effect of challenger spending declines by a 
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factor of two, the estimated marginal effect of incumbent spending declines by a factor of 
six. The magnitude of the decline in spending coefficients represents the extent of the 
omitted variable bias (i.e., soft money). Thus, it appears that soft money plays a bigger 
role in an incumbent's campaign than in a challenger's. Incumbents are able to use their 
incumbency status (such as name recognition, free media access, and political 
connections) to attract soft money donors.  
Also, the difference between the number of observations in the BCRA sample 
(2004-2008) and the post-Citizens United sample (2010-2012) is striking. The BCRA 
sample includes 1036 races involving senior incumbents, whereas the post-Citizens 
United sample includes 590 such races, just over half as many. The number of close 
races, however, is virtually identical, implying a vast increase in the frequency of close 
races after the Citizens United ruling.  
Changing campaign finance laws is one of many potential sources of the rising 
incidence of close races. The difference in the frequency of close races under the BCRA 
and the Citizens United ruling offers mixed policy implications for campaign finance 
reform. An increase in the number of close races suggests a rise in challengers' initial 
electoral viability. As the BCRA blocked the challengers’ access to outside funds, it is 
likely that challengers found it difficult to overcome the incumbent's fixed financial 
advantage associated with being in office. The Citizens United ruling, by contrast, allows 
soft money to funnel into challengers' campaign activities, enabling challengers to 
undercut the initial fundraising ability of an incumbent. Soft money donations increase 
the amount of money used to finance challengers' campaigns, which in turn raises voters' 
perception of candidates' electoral viability. As a result, challengers are more likely than 
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before to emerge as frontrunners. In the face of an amplified incumbency advantage 
under the ruling, however, whether or not these new frontrunners can sustain their status 
remains unanswered. While the Citizens United ruling seems to have leveled the playing 
field by raising the challenger's ex-ante winning prospects, an increase in the number of 
competitive races may be misleading if incumbents are able to more than compensate for 
the initially dampened financial advantage by attracting larger soft money donations. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper adopts Erikson and Palfrey (2000)'s focus on close races to control for 
the problem of causal feedback in measuring campaign spending effects. The extent to 
which I was able to replicate Erikson and Palfrey's estimate of spending effects shows 
that in close races, spending effects are shielded from the simultaneity bias that plagues 
the estimates on the full sample.  
I then extend my analysis to examine the impact of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (2002) and the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling 
(2010) on candidates' spending effects. I find that removing the influence of soft money 
heightens the perceived effectiveness of campaign spending, as candidates are no longer 
able to rely on soft money donations as a substitute for their own funds. Both incumbent 
and challenger spending coefficients increase significantly during the BCRA period. 
Estimates of spending effects in the post Citizens United election cycles, however, imply 
that while official challenger spending still matters, official incumbent spending has little 
to no effect on obtaining votes.  
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In the 2010 and 2012 races, soft money began to play a significant role in 
electoral campaigns. With a vast amount of outside funds back on the political scene, the 
size of the candidate's own campaign fund is likely to matter less than before. Since the 
reported data on campaign expenditures do not include soft money donations, the 
negative correlation between soft money and candidates' own funds seems to have caused 
a downward bias in both incumbent and challenger spending coefficients.  
Thus, the smaller coefficient on incumbent spending effects should not be 
interpreted as evidence that a dollar spent by a challenger is substantially more effective 
than a dollar spent by an incumbent. Rather, the difference between the magnitudes of the 
omitted variable bias, represented by the size of the decline in the two spending 
coefficients, may arise because incumbents are able to take advantage of their non-
monetary incumbency benefits to attract monetary help from soft money donors. If it 
turns out that unreported soft money donation does indeed result in omitted variable bias, 
this study suggests that deregulation of soft money amplifies the incumbency advantage. 
While the Citizens United ruling opens up the possibility for challengers to receive soft 
money to finance their campaigns and increase their electoral competitiveness, it would 
appear that soft money is yet another dimension along which incumbents enjoy an 
advantage.  
Due to uncertainty over the proper econometric method, academic researchers 
have been hesitant to establish a causal connection between incumbent spending and vote 
shares (Stratmann 2005). The BCRA, although no longer in effect, provides academics 
with a new, more accurate source for future research. Because the BCRA reduced the 
influence of soft money from the political scene, the 2004-2008 election cycles are the 
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period in which measured spending most closely matches actual spending. Estimates of 
spending effects using the BCRA data are thus less subject to the omitted variable bias 
that likely complicates the estimates of the pre-BCRA and post-Citizens United spending 
coefficients. According to the estimates presented in the previous section, under the 
BCRA, both incumbent and challenger spending play a much bigger role than predicted 
by previous campaign spending literature, such as Erikson and Palfrey (2000) and Gerber 
(1998). If indeed the BCRA spending coefficients represent the "true" marginal effect of 
candidate spending, this paper suggests that candidates’ fundraising activities are in fact 
worth their time and effort, unlike what is suggested by academic measures of the 
candidate spending effect.  
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